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I. INTRODUCTION

Article III of the Constitution confers upon federal judges the
duty to decide cases and controversies.' The "case or controversy"
requirement distinguishes the judiciary from the legislative and
executive branches of government, which make and enforce laws
of general application for the benefit of the entire Republic. As
Alexander Hamilton declared in Federalist No. 78, the judiciary
"may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely

* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judge Hardiman
gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his law clerk, Justin Presant, who provided helpful comments on the draft.
t A law clerk to Judge Hardiman from 2010-11, Mr. Heppner is an associate at Reed
Smith, LLP. Mr. Heppner received his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 2008 and his
Ph.D. in English Literature from Tufts University in 2003.

1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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judgment."2 For that reason, Hamilton argued that the judiciary
would be the "least dangerous" branch of the federal government.3
Hamilton's argument depended, of course, on the caveat that
"[tihe courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should
be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that
of the legislative body."4
The duty to make individualized judgments is a categorical imperative when it comes to criminal sentencing. Sentences must be
imposed based on the facts and circumstances of each case, rather
than to "make a statement" about crime and punishment generally. 5 Congress codified such an approach by requiring judges to
consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," as well as the timehonored concepts of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.7 Courts also must evaluate "the kinds of sentence
and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of
offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the [United States Sentencing] [GIuidelines" ("Sentencing
Guidelines" or "Guidelines"),8 and "the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct."9
To insist that each sentence must be determined on an individualized basis is not to deny that patterns develop and some cases
resemble one another in significant ways. Indeed, these patterns
and categories generally are well described in the Sentencing
Guidelines. ° But as much as the Guidelines serve as a valid starting point and useful frame of reference, they do not have all the
answers. For that reason, most district judges are pleased that
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 500.
5. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) ("It has been uniform and
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue."), superseded by statute, Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 670.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2010).
7. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
8. Id. § 3553(a)(4).
9. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
10. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007) ("[I]t is fair to assume that the
Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might
achieve § 3553(a)'s objectives.").
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United States v. Booker"-which rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory after holding their mandatory nature violative of
the Sixth Amendment' 2-restored much of the discretion judges
had lost during the era of mandatory guidelines.
In the wake of Booker, federal district courts have wrestled with
the scope of their discretion to vary from the applicable advisory
Guidelines ranges. 3 Many of the initial difficulties related to the
100-to-1 crack/powder ratio found in section 2D1.1(c) of the
Guidelines.' 4 For two years, sentencing judges expressed uncertainty regarding the extent of their power to vary from the
crack/powder ratio, until the Court in Kimbrough v. United
States 5 held that the "parsimony provision" of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
allowed judges to conclude that the 100-to-1 ratio was inappropriate in certain cases. 6 Once judges were unencumbered by the
crack/powder disparity of the Guidelines, they struggled with
what ratio to apply and when and how to apply a different ratio. 7
One term after Kimbrough, the Court made a significant clarification in Spears v. United States,'" holding that judges were not only
free to determine that the crack/powder disparity was unfair in
individual cases, but that they were empowered to declare, based
on a policy disagreement, that the disparity is unfair in all cases."
Not surprisingly, the decisions in Kimbrough and Spears have re-

11. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
12. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
13. Compare Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First
Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34 (2010) ("For sentences not governed by a mandatory minimum,
in the Pre-Booker period the rate of variance in sentence length explained by the identity of
the judge was very small, just 1.4%, and the relationship was not statistically significant.
After Booker, however, the rate more than doubled to 3.1% and the identity of the judge
became a statistically significant predictor of sentence length.") with Michael A. Simons,
Prosecutorsas Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.
303, 346-47 & n.251 (2009) ("Instead of a revolution, Booker represents a modest rollback of
the sentencing reforms of the past twenty years. The now-advisory Guidelines are still
central to sentencing determinations and, indeed, most sentences remain within the advisory range.").
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2010).
15. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
16. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91.
17. See, e.g., William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroadsof the Three Branches: The U.S.
Sentencing Commission's Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of InterBranch Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & Pol. 305, 327-31 (2011); Scott, supra note 13, at 1 ("Since
Booker, Kimbrough, and Gall, the effect of the judge on sentence length has doubled in
strength."); Michael B. Cassidy, Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough
World, 42 AKRON L. REV. 105, 128-32 (2009).
18. 555 U.S. 261 (2009).
19. Spears, 555 U.S. at 265-66.
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sulted in wide disparities in sentences for defendants accused of
drug crimes involving crack cocaine."
This article does not discuss the disparities occasioned by
crack/powder ratios.21 Instead, we address the broader question of
whether Kimbrough and Spears mean that judges may disregard
any Sentencing Guidelines with which they have a policy disagreement. The article focuses on three aspects of the Guidelines
that have been the source of much debate in this regard: (1) the
career offender Guideline (section 4B1.1), the policy statement
regarding "fast-track" authorization (section 5K3.1), and the child
pornography Guideline (section 2G2.2). 22 The article predicts that
these disputes soon will be resolved by the Supreme Court. And
the manner in which the Court resolves them may determine
whether Booker heralded the death knell of the Sentencing Guidelines, even as an advisory matter.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Booker has been the
subject of extensive commentary.23 Accordingly, we offer only a
brief synopsis of the relevant background.
20. See Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing DisparityAfter Booker: A First Look, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1, 34 (2010) ("For cases not subject to a mandatory minimum, the trend is
unmistakable. The distribution of average sentences among judges [in the District Court of
Massachusetts, the only District Court with judge-specific data available,] has grown substantially wider since Booker: from a total spread of fifteen months before Booker, to almost thirty months after Booker, to almost forty months in the wake of Kimbrough and
Gall."). Compare United States v. House, 551 F.3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding 188
month sentence-within the 188 to 235-month Guidelines range, based on an offense level
of 36 and a criminal history category of I-for a defendant convicted of two counts of distribution of crack cocaine, including a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice), with
United States v. Whigham, 754 F. Supp. 2d 239, 244 (D. Mass. 2010) (imposing sixty month
sentence-a downward departure from the 188 to 235-month Guidelines range, based on an
offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI-for a defendant convicted of three
counts of distribution of crack cocaine and sentenced as a career offender).
21. For examples of articles doing so, see Steven L. Chanenson, Booker on Crack: Sentencing's Latest GordianKnot, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551 (2006); Ryan S. King &
Marc Mauer, Sentencing with Discretion: Crack Cocaine Sentencing After Booker, 18 FED.
SENTG REP. 134 (2005); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational
Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARiz. L REV. 1233 (1996); Maxwell Arlie Halpern Kosman,

Note, Falling Through the Crack: How Courts Have Struggled to Apply the Crack Amendment to "NominalCareer"and 'Plea Bargain"Defendants, 109 MICH. L. REV. 785 (2011).
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2G2.2, 4B1.1, & 5K3.1 (2010).
23. See, e.g., Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 9 (2005); D. Michael Fisher,

Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretionagainsta Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65 (2007); Craig Green, Booker and
Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO.
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Prior to the nineteenth century, criminal laws typically provided
for fixed statutory sentences.24 During the 1800s, those laws began to give way to statutes that allowed judges to exercise discretion within certain ranges.25 As judges exercised this discretion,
the Supreme Court ensured that sentences were imposed consistent with due process (Townsend v. Burke26 ) and the right to counsel (Mempa v. Rhay27 ), and were not based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or political affiliation (Zant v.
Stephens21).

The appellate oversight exemplified by Townsend, Mempa, and
Zant was quite limited. As long as nothing particularly unusual
was said or done at the sentencing hearing, sentences within the
statutory range were essentially immune from appellate review."
This system produced great variations in sentences depending
upon geography, race, age, and type of criminal offense. 0 Sometimes these variations occurred even within one courthouse, depending upon which judge a defendant had the good fortune (or
misfortune) of appearing before.3 These variations were the impetus for more uniformity that resulted in the creation of the United
States Sentencing Commission by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984,2 and the promulgation of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines in 1987. 33 From 1987 until 2005, when the Supreme
L.J. 395 (2005); Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 155 (2005); Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors,and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008).
24. See Note, The Admissibility of CharacterEvidence in Determining Sentence, 9 U.
CHI. L. REV. 715 (1942).
25. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (citations omitted).
26. 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
27. 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
28. 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
29. See, e.g., James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, MeasuringInter-Judge
Sentencing Disparity Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON.
271, 275 (April, 1999) ("Prior to the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines a federal
judge's sentencing discretion was enormous and virtually unreviewable.").
30. See S. REP. No. 225, at 78 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235 (Reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities was "the major premise of the sentencing guidelines.").
31. See, e.g., ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SENTENCING STUDY, A REPORT TO JUDGES 1-3, 9 (1974); William Austin & Thomas A. Williams III, A Survey of Judges' Responses to Simulated Legal Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306, 306-10 (1977) (Forty-seven district
court judges reviewed five hypothetical cases and recommended widely disparate sentences.).
32. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1937 (codified as
amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (2010) and 28 U.S.C. 991-998 (2010)).
33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, subpt. 1 (1987).
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Court decided Booker, federal judges operated under a somewhat
oxymoronic scheme of "mandatory guidelines."
As relevant to this article, the first case of interest in the wake
of Booker was Rita v. United States.4 Victor Rita was convicted of
making two false statements to a grand jury and faced an advisory
Guidelines range of thirty-three to forty-one months. 35 Citing his
work as a government cooperator, his military service, and his
poor health, Rita argued that he should be sentenced below the
Guidelines range. 36 The United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina disagreed, holding that the
Guidelines were appropriate and imposing a bottom-of-theGuidelines sentence of thirty-three months imprisonment. 7 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected Rita's argument that his sentence was unreasonable.3 8 In doing so, the Court applied a presumption of reasonableness for all within-Guidelines sentences.39
At that time, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits applied a presumption of reasonableness to appeals challenging withinGuidelines sentences, while the Courts of Appeals for the First,
Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits did not apply such a presumption.4" The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by
upholding the presumption of reasonableness applied by the
Fourth Circuit to Rita's case, while stating that the courts of appeals that did not apply a presumption of reasonableness were not
obliged to adopt it. 4
Fewer than six months after Rita, the Supreme Court issued
two significant sentencing opinions: Gall v. United States42 and
Kimbrough v. United States.4 3 Brian Gall was a sophomore at the
University of Iowa and a user of ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana
when he joined a conspiracy to distribute ecstasy.4 4 Despite his
34. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
35. Rita, 551 U.S. at 341, 343.
36. Id. at 345.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 346.
39. Id.
40. Rita, 551 U.S. at 346.
41. Id. at 355-56. The Court in Rita also held that: (i) the presumption of reasonableness does not violate the Sixth Amendment; (ii) the trial judge's very brief review of the §
3553(a) factors was sufficient; and (iii) the trial judge did not err in considering Rita's special circumstances. Id. at 355-360.
42. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
43. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
44. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.
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relatively brief participation in the conspiracy, Gall trafficked
enough ecstasy to earn a profit of over $30,000."5 Gall reformed
himself, graduated from college, moved to Arizona, and eventually
became a master carpenter. 6 Federal agents caught up with him
in Arizona, and Gall readily admitted his involvement with the
drug distribution ring." More than three years after he withdrew
from the conspiracy, Gall was indicted in Iowa and turned himself
in.41 After reaching a written plea agreement with the government, Gall's advisory Guidelines range was thirty to thirty-seven
months imprisonment. 9 The government advocated for a withinGuidelines sentence, but the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa imposed no jail time and only probation of thirty-six
months." Citing the various facts demonstrating that Gall had
turned his life around prior to indictment, Judge Pratt concluded
that a sentence of incarceration was inappropriate.51
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, relying on
52 which established that
its opinion in United States v. Claiborne,
sentences outside the Guidelines range must be justified in a way
that "is proportional to the extent of the difference between the
advisory range and the sentence imposed." 3 Informing the decision of the Eighth Circuit was its view that Gall's probationary
sentence, when compared to an advisory Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months imprisonment, constituted "a 100%
downward variance" that must be supported by "extraordinary
circumstances."54
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit, holding that "while the extent of the difference between a
particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is
surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentenceswhether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range-under a deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard."5
The Court also affirmed Gall's sentence, holding that it was rea45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 44-45.
439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, 551 U.S. 87 (2007).
Gall, 552 U.S. at 45 (quoting Claiborne, 439 F.3d at 481, vacated, 551 U.S. 87).
Id.
Id. at 41.
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sonable under the circumstances." Reflecting the lack of consensus on the heels of Booker, four justices wrote separately." In a
nod to stare decisis, Justice Scalia concurred, acknowledging that
Rita must be followed but reiterating his view that "substantivereasonableness review is inherently flawed." 8 Justice Souter also
concurred, opining that a new act of Congress would be the best
way to resolve "the tension between substantial consistency
throughout the system and the right of jury trial" that was highlighted in Booker.59 In a one sentence dissent, Justice Thomas
wrote that the district court "committed statutory error when it
departed below the applicable Guidelines range," ° a position consistent with his dissenting view in Kimbrough that "Congress, by
making the Guidelines mandatory, quite clearly intended to bind
district courts to the Sentencing Commission's categorical policy
judgments."6 ' Finally, in a more expansive dissent, Justice Alito
explained his view that the remedial decision in Booker requires
district courts to give "at least some significant weight" to policy
decisions in the Guidelines.62 Disagreeing with the view expressed
by Justices Stevens and Scalia-that Booker restored essentially
unconstrained discretion to sentencing judges--Justice Alito explained that "[ilt is unrealistic to think [the Sentencing Reform
Act's goal of reducing sentencing disparities] can be achieved over
the long term if sentencing judges need only give lip service to the
Guidelines." 8 The variety of opinions expressed by five justices in
Gall presaged the differences of opinion in the courts of appeals in
the wake of Kimbrough.
In Kimbrough, which was decided the same day as Gall, Derrick
Kimbrough pleaded guilty to: (1) conspiracy to distribute crack
and powder cocaine; (2) possession with intent to distribute more
than fifty grams of crack cocaine; (3) possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine; and (4) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. 4 Kimbrough faced a statutory
56. Id.
57. Id. at 60 (Scalia, J. concurring). Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Id. at 61 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Id. (Alito J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Gall, 552 U.S. at 38 (majority opinion).
58. Gall, 552 U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 61 (Souter, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
61. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 115 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62. Gall, 552 U.S. at 61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 63.
64. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91.
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sentencing range of ten years to life for his three drug offenses and
an additional five years to life for his firearm crime.65 As part of
his guilty plea, Kimbrough admitted responsibility for fifty-six
grams of crack cocaine and 92.1 grams of powder cocaine.66 Under
the Sentencing Guidelines, these drug quantities yielded a base
offense level of thirty-two. After other adjustments, including a
mandatory sixty months for the gun crime, Kimbrough's final advisory Guidelines range was 228 to 270 months imprisonment.68
According to the district court, a within-Guidelines sentence
would have violated the "parsimony provision," which requires
courts to impose sentences "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to accomplish the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 9
After considering the appropriate sentencing factors, the district
court noted that had Kimbrough been responsible for an equivalent quantity of powder cocaine instead of crack cocaine, his advisory Guidelines range would have been only 97 to 106 months imprisonment. ° Citing the "disproportionate and unjust effect that
crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing," Judge Jackson sentenced Kimbrough to the statutory mandatory minimum of 180
months, a downward variance from his advisory Guidelines range,
because it was "clearly long enough.""
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Kimbrough's sentence based on its prior holding that a sentence "outside the guidelines range is per se unreasonable when it is based
on a disagreement with the sentencing disparity for crack and
powder cocaine offenses."' 2
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a sentencing judge is
free to vary categorically from the suggested Guidelines range
based on a disagreement with the crack/powder disparity embodied in Guideline section 2D1.1. 73 However, the Court found "no
occasion for elaborative discussion" of the nature of such disagreements, because the crack cocaine "Guidelines do not exemplify
the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role,"
65. Id. at 91-92.
66. Id. at 92.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 92-93.
70. Id. at 93.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App'x 798, 799 (4th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam), rev'd, 552 U.S. 558).
73. Id. at 109-10.
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in that they were not based on empirical study or even the Commission's own policy convictions."4
Kimbrough thus authorized judges to put aside the crack cocaine Guidelines range based on their disagreement with it, but
also left at least three questions unanswered. First, could district
courts disregard the crack cocaine Guidelines range based on a
general policy disagreement in all cases, or only based on a specific disagreement with its application to the particular case before
them? Second, could district courts reject other Guidelines sections because of a policy disagreement? If so, which ones? Finally, are such policy-based rejections applicable only to those sections which do not reflect the Commission's "exercise of its characteristic role," or could district courts vary for policy reasons despite a Guideline's basis in empirical study? The first of those
questions was answered affirmatively in Spears.75 The courts of
appeals have expressed divergent opinions regarding the second
question, to which we turn now before addressing the third question.
III. APPLICATIONS OF KIMBROUGH/SPEARS TO OTHER GUIDELINES
SECTIONS

Since Kimbrough and Spears were decided, criminal defendants
have invited federal district judges to disagree with other Guidelines on policy grounds.76 This Section reviews three of the most
heavily litigated aspects of three Guidelines: career offender designations (section 4B1.1), fast-track jurisdictions for immigrationrelated crimes (section 5K3.1), and child pornography (section
2G2.2).
A.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4B1. 1-Career

Offenders
After Kimbrough, one of the first Guidelines to receive judicial
scrutiny was section 4B1. 1, the career offender provision, which is
used to determine a Guidelines range when a defendant has two
or more prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or drug offenses.7 Courts initially disagreed as to whether Kimbrough au74. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109.
75. 555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009).
76. See infra notes 81, 89, 133, 170.
77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a)(3) (2010).
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thorized sentencing judges to reject the career offender provision
on policy grounds. 8 Because the provision indirectly incorporates
the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio, which the Supreme Court had
already determined was a valid basis to reject a Guidelines section, the question courts faced was not simply what constitutes a
valid policy disagreement, but rather with what, or with whom
could a valid policy disagreement form the basis of a variance?
Whose policy choices were embodied in the career offender provision, Congress's or the Sentencing Commission's? And, with
whose policy choices were sentencing judges entitled to disagree?
If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions for
crimes of violence or drug offenses, section 4B1.1 increases his
criminal history to the highest category (VI), and usually assigns a
higher offense level based on the statutory maximum applicable
for the defendant's crime of conviction.79 Because the higher offense levels are based on the statutory maximum sentences, which
are, in turn, based upon the crack/powder distinction, section
4B1.1 incorporates the crack/powder distinction. The Sentencing
Commission promulgated the career offender Guideline pursuant
to the congressional directive in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, which stated that the "Commission shall assure that the
guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near
the maximum term authorized" for repeat offenders of certain offenses."
Against this backdrop, courts were asked to decide
whether the authority described in Kimbrough to reject the
crack/powder disparity in the drug table of section 2D1.1 of the
Guidelines extended to the career offender provision of section
4B1.1.

78.

See infra notes 81, 89.

79.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(b).

80. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2010). See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 cmt.
background (2010). 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) applies only to crimes of violence and particular
sections of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2010) and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 955, and 959 (2010). § 994(h). Section
4B1.1 applies to those offenses, but also sweeps in other offenses, because the Guidelines
define "controlled substance offense" more broadly, as:
[A]n offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a
controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import,
export, distribute, or dispense.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b). See United States v. Knox, 573 F.3d
441, 449-50 (7th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing between those offenses included in section 4B1.1
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) and those included only by the language of section 4B1.1).
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The First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals initially held that sentencing judges had no authority to reject section 4B1.1. 8
They reasoned that, while Kimbrough
granted sentencing judges the authority to reject a Guideline
based on the crack/powder disparity, it did not grant them the authority to reject congressional enactments.82 Because judges could
not contravene the legislative will expressed in the mandatory
maximum sentences from which section 4B1.1 derived the applicable offense levels, judges likewise could not contravene the offense levels.83 Stated differently, those courts found that the increased Guidelines range resulting from section 4B1.1 was not
based on the potentially objectionable policy underlying the Sentencing Commission's use of a 100-to-1 ratio, but rather was
based on statutory maxima by which Congress expressed its policy
choices.8 4
Some courts holding that sentencing judges could not reject the
career offender Guideline also relied on 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)85 as the
81. United States v. Vazquez (Vazquez II), 558 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010) (mem.) (citation omitted); United States v. McCorkle, 291 F.
App'x 545, 545 n.1 (4th Cir. 2008) ("We find that Kimbrough is of no assistance to McCorkle
because his ultimate guideline range was not determined based on drug quantity but on his
status as a career offender."); United States v. Grissom, 290 F. App'x 258, 260 (11th Cir.
2008) ("[Grissom's] offense level was based on his status as a career offender, which ...
does not distinguish between crack and powder cocaine. Thus, the range suggested by the
Guidelines-and adopted by the district court--was not the result of the disparity discussed in Kimbrough."); United States v. Harris, 536 F.3d 798, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2008), overruled by United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jimenez,
512 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[Tlhe crack/powder dichotomy is irrelevant to the career
offender sentence actually imposed in this case").
82. See, e.g., Vazquez 11, 558 F.3d at 1227 (citing United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d
1353, 1370 (11th Cir. 2006)) ("[B]y disregarding Section 4B1.1, the district court impermissibly 'ignored Congress's policy of targeting recidivist drug offenders for more severe punishment.'").
83. Vazquez 11, 558 F.3d at 1227.
84. See Harris,536 F.3d at 812-13.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2010) provides that:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in
which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and(1) has been convicted of a felony that is(A) a crime of violence; or
(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and chapter 705 of title 46; and
(2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior felonies, each of which is(A) a crime of violence; or
(B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
841), sections 1002(a), 1005, and 1009 of the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a), 955, and 959), and chapter 705 of title 46.
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legislative embodiment of an additional policy choice: namely,
that career offenders should be sentenced near the maximum penalty permitted by law.86 At least one court noted that section
4B1.1 actually included more offenses than required by § 994(h),
and reasoned that those extra offenses, which were the product of
the Commission's own judgment, could give rise to variances,
while the others, which were included at the express direction of
Congress, presumably could not.8 ' Another court opined that
Kimbrough itself impliedly supported disallowing rejection of the
career offender Guideline, because "the Supreme Court in Kimbrough cited section 994(h) as an example of an instance where
Congress has expressly incorporated a sentencing policy into the
Guidelines.""s
Meanwhile, some courts of appeals, including some of those that
had initially held otherwise, held that Kimbrough authorized
judges to reject section 4Bl.1 based on a policy disagreement. 9
These courts typically reasoned that while sentencing judges are
bound by statutory maxima and minima, Kimbrough permits
them to reject the Guidelines based on a policy disagreement, regardless of whether the Guidelines range embodies a legislative
policy choice.9 ° Some courts opined that because 28 U.S.C. §
994(h) was directed at the Sentencing Commission rather than at
the courts, it did not require specific sentences-it merely mandated the Guidelines range, which the sentencing court was then
28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2010).
86. United States v. Welton, 583 F.3d 494, 498-499 (7th Cir. 2009) (mem.) (citations
omitted) (noting that § 994(h) "reflects a Congressional policy with which a sentencing
court may not disagree"), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2061 (2010), overruled by Corner, 598 F.3d
411; Vazquez 1I, 558 F.3d at 1227 (citing United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1370
(2006) (holding pre-Kimbrough that a sentencing judge erred by basing a sentence in part
on a disagreement with section 4B1. 1, because doing so "ignored Congress's policy of targeting recidivist drug offenders for more severe punishment")).
87. United States v. Knox, 573 F.3d 441, 449-50 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)
(distinguishing between those offenses included in Guidelines section 4B1.1 at the discretion of the Sentencing Commission, which the sentencing judge could reject after Kimbrough, and those offenses specifically included because they are listed in § 994(h), which a
sentencing judge impliedly could not reject).
88. Welton, 583 U.S. at 496, 498-99 (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85,
103 (2007) ('Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms. For example, Congress has specifically required the Sentencing Commission
to set Guidelines sentences for serious recidivist offenders "at or near" the statutory maximum.")).
89. United States v. Bradley, 409 F. App'x 308, 310 (11th Cir. 2011) (recognizing abrogation of Vazquez II and Williams); United States v. Gray, 577 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir.
2009); United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 327-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted);
United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
90. See supra note 89.
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free to reject for policy reasons. 91 Eventually, and particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in Spears, this position prevailed
and the view that sentencing judges could not reject section 4B1.1
on policy grounds fell out of favor."
The case of Carlos Vazquez illustrates the convoluted trajectory
of the career offender Guideline. Vazquez was arrested for trying
to purchase three kilograms of cocaine from a confidential informant, and eventually pleaded guilty in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida to one count of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 846.13 At
the sentencing hearing conducted before Kimbrough was decided,
Judge Presnell determined that, but for the application of section
4B1.1, Vazquez's Guidelines offense level would have been twentysix (based on the quantity of cocaine involved and his acceptance
of responsibility) and his criminal history category would have
been V (based on three previous felony convictions), yielding an
advisory Guidelines range of 110 to 137 months. 94 After the career
offender Guideline of section 4B1.1 was applied, however, Vazquez's offense level increased to thirty-two and his criminal history category rose to VI, yielding an advisory sentencing range of
210 to 262 months.95
In addition to considering the specifics of Vazquez's case, Judge
Presnell noted his general dissatisfaction with the career offender
provision. 9 He stated that it "created 'a quantum leap in the
guideline calculation,' in which the Sentencing Commission 'attempt[ed] to come up with a definition that applie[d] to all people
in all circumstances, without regard to the actual offenses or the
nature of the offense or the timing of the offense.'"97 The judge
opined that "the guidelines simply cannot operate realistically on
91. United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[Slection 994(h) only
addresses what the Sentencing Commission must do; it doesn't require sentencing courts to
impose sentences "at or near" the statutory maximums."); United States v. Sanchez, 517
F.3d 651, 663 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Section 994(h), however, by its terms, is a direction to the
Sentencing Commission, not to the courts, and it finds no express analog in Title 18 or Title
21.").
92. See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 218 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that "[t]his
reasoning seems to be falling out of favor").
93. See United States v. Vazquez (Vazquez 1), 240 F. App'x 318, 319 (11th Cir. 2007).
94. See United States v. Vazquez (Vazquez III), No. 6:04-cr-212-Orl-31DAB, 2011 WL
2565526, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2011).
95. See Vazquez III, 2011 WL 2565526, at *1.
96. See Vazquez 1, 240 F. App'x at 320.
97. Id.
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the human level," and they could lead one "astray in situations
where you have these quantum-type leaps."98 Recognizing that
"the guidelines, of course, are important and entitled to deference," he also noted that he had "a statutory obligation to consider the factors in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]."9" Pursuant to that statute,
Vazquez was sentenced to 110 months imprisonment, a sentence
below the Guidelines range for a career offender but within the
range that would have applied but for the section 4B1.1 enhancement.'00
The government appealed the sentence, arguing that it was procedurally unreasonable because a sentencing judge's own disagreement with the career offender provision was not a permissible
basis for varying downward from the Guidelines range. 0' The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that the
"court's disagreement with the effect of the career-offender provision in this case imbued the entire sentencing hearing, and ...the
court's disagreement with the Guidelines [was] an impermissible
factor [in the] sentencing calculus." 2' The court of appeals, following its pre-Kimbrough precedent in United States v. Williams, reasoned that "Is]ection 4B1.1 embodies Congressional policy, reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), 'that repeat drug offenders receive sentences "at or near" the enhanced statutory maximums set out in
[21 U.S.C.] § 841(b).""' 3
Before Vazquez could be re-sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Kimbrough. On remand, Judge Presnell recognized that
Kimbrough had, in part, overruled Williams, which was the basis
for the Eleventh Circuit's decision."°4 Although Williams had prohibited consideration of policy disagreements with both the
crack/powder disparity and the career offender provision, Judge
Presnell reasoned that only the former had been overruled by
Kimbrough, because Kimbrough was based on the fact that the
100-to-1 ratio did not explicitly embody a legislative policy.'
Therefore, having concluded that the "career-offender enhance98. Id.
99. Id. (alteration in original).
100. Id. at 321.
101. Vazquez 1, 240 F. App'x at 319.
102. Id. at 323 (citing United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1360 (2006).
103. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Williams, 456 F.3d 1369; U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.1 cmt. Background (2010)).
104. Vazquez III, No. 6:04-cr-212-Orl-31DAB, 2011 WL 2565526, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June
28, 2011) (citation omitted).
105. See Vazquez III, 2011 WL 2565526, at *2.
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ment was likely still immune from policy-based criticism under
Williams, [Judge Presnell] increased Vazquez's sentence from 110
months to 180 months [still a downward departure from the advisory sentencing range of 210 to 262 months, given on other
grounds,] expressly set[ting] aside [his] policy-based concerns

about [section] 4B1. 1.,,106

This time Vazquez appealed, arguing that Kimbrough should
extend to policy disagreements with the career offender provision. °7 Once again relying on Williams, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 180-month sentence. 10 8 The Court of Appeals found
that Kimbrough not only failed to overrule Williams, it actually
supported the notion that the career offender Guideline could not
be rejected on policy grounds. 9 It did so by distinguishing between the crack cocaine Guidelines at issue in Kimbrough and the
career offender Guideline."' The court reasoned that, although
the crack/powder disparity was based originally on congressionally-created mandatory sentences, "Congress did not direct the Sentencing Commission [explicitly] to create [the crack/powder] disparity"-[unlike] the Guideline's punishment of career offenderswhich was explicitly directed by Congress [in 28 U.S.C. §
994(h)].""'
When Vazquez petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan reversed course in light
of Kimbrough and argued, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's decision, that "Kimbrough's reference to Section 994(h) as an example
of Congress directing 'the Sentencing Commission' to adopt a
Guideline reflecting a particular policy, did not suggest that Congress had bound sentencing courts through Section 994."1 2 The
Solicitor General contended that Booker and Kimbrough had rendered all of the Guidelines open to a sentencing judge's disagreement on policy grounds, subject to reasonableness review on appeal." 3 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded
for further consideration in light of the Solicitor General's posi106. Id.
107. Vazquez 11, 558 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010)
(mem.).
108. Vazquez 11, 553 F.3d at 1228.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Brief for the United States at 9, Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010)
(No. 09-5370), 2009 WL 5423020, at *9 (citation omitted).
113. Id. at *10 (citation omitted).
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tion. 4 On remand for the second time, Judge Presnell found that
his initial rejection of the career offender provision had been reasonable and resentenced Vazquez, imposing a 90-month sentence
(a twenty-month reduction from the 110-month sentence he had
initially imposed, to account for Vazquez's post-sentencing rehabilitation)."5
As the trajectory of the Vazquez cases indicates, the effect of
Kimbrough on the career offender Guideline posed significant confusion for the courts. But how the courts treated the career offender Guideline also provides insight into the general effects of
Kimbrough, particularly with respect to legislative policy choices
and control of the Guidelines. First, it demonstrates that for congressional directives and policy choices to bind sentencing courts,
they must be directed explicitly at the courts, presumably in terms
of mandatory sentences.
Otherwise, congressional directives
aimed at the Sentencing Commission, which become embodied in
the Guidelines, can be rejected by sentencing judges with policy
disagreements. This is in keeping with the second principle which
can be derived from Kimbrough; namely, that legislative involvement with the formulation of the Guidelines may subject them to
challenge. Most courts considering policy rejections of section
4B1.1 had no occasion to inquire whether that section had been
promulgated by the Sentencing Commission in an "exercise of its
characteristic institutional role,""' because they typically deemed
the critique of the crack/powder disparity to be a policy disagreement that had received the Supreme Court's imprimatur. The
initial confusion about this issue is reflected in the fact that one
court actually found, in a now-vacated decision, that Congress's
explicit control of the Guidelines through 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) indicated that the Commission was exercising that role."7 The consensus among the courts of appeals now seems to be that close
congressional control, short of the imposition of mandatory sentences, may weigh against a finding that the Commission exer-

114. Vazquez H, 130 S. Ct. 1135, 1135 (2010).
115. Vazquez III, No. 6:04-cr-212-Orl-31DAB, 2011 WL 2565526, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June
28, 2011) (citation omitted).
116. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007).
117. United States v. Funk, 534 F.3d 522, 528 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated on grant ofreb'g
en banc, No. 05-3708 (Dec. 18, 2008) ("[T]he career offender guideline in this case (§ 4B1.1)
is exactly the type of guideline issue that 'exemplifTies] the Commission's exercise of its
characteristic institutional role.' In fact, this provision is the direct result of Congress's
directive.").
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cised its characteristic role, and actually pave the way for a policybased rejection of the Guideline at issue."8
B.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINE § 5K3.1-"Fast-

Track"
Early disposition programs--colloquially known as "fast-track"
jurisdictions--originated in the mid-1990s by United States Attorneys in districts in California and the southwestern United
States. 19' In an effort to manage burgeoning caseloads, United
States Attorneys facilitated reduced sentences for some defendants accused of immigration-related crimes. 2 ° These sentences
were achieved by selectively charging lesser offenses ("charge bargaining"), recommending shorter sentences, or agreeing to lower
Guidelines offense levels in exchange for timely plea agreements
waiving various rights, such as indictment by a grand jury, trial
by jury, preparation of a presentence investigation report, and the
right to appeal the sentence.12 ' Such programs proliferated and
now exist in many districts across the country."'
Congress provided for these fast-track programs in §
401(m)(2)(B) of the 2003 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act ("PROTECT Act"),
which instructed the Commission to issue a policy statement authorizing a downward departure "pursuant to an early disposition
Although §
program authorized by the Attorney General." 22
401(m)(2)(B) created a mechanism for a downward departure, the
PROTECT Act, passed before Booker was decided, generally
sought to "ensure that the
incidence of downward departures are
24
substantially reduced."
After the PROTECT Act became law, Attorney General John
Ashcroft issued a memorandum ("Ashcroft Memorandum") to fed118. See infra note 143.
119. United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Mejia, 461 F.3d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
120. Mejia, 461 F.3d at 160.
121. Id.
122. As of March 31, 2009, the Attorney General had authorized early disposition programs in seventeen districts around the country. See Memorandum from David W. Ogden,
Deputy Att'y. Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to U.S. Att'ys on Authorization for
Early Disposition Programs (Mar. 31, 2009), reprinted in 21 FED. SENT. R. 4, 18 (2009),
available at http-//www.fd.org/pdfjlib/ogden%20memo--ft%20authorization--5.29.09.pdf.
123. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 675 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28,
and 42 U.S.C.).
124. Id. § 401(m)(2)(A).
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eral prosecutors regarding fast-track programs.
The Ashcroft
Memorandum established requirements that districts must meet
to qualify for early disposition programs-typically districts with a
heavy caseload in a particular area.'26 It also specified what rights
qualifying defendants must waive and what benefits the prosecutors could confer in return, including either a four-level departure
or a lesser charge. 12 7 Although the Ashcroft Memorandum was not
limited to the immigration context, "[mlost fast-track programs
have been authorized for 'illegal reentry after deportation,' and all
other crimes that are allowed to receive fast-track disposition are
immigration-related." 28
Subsequent to the issuance of the Ashcroft Memorandum, the
Sentencing Commission proposed a new policy statement, section
5K3.1, "Early Disposition Programs (Policy Statement)," effective
on October 27, 2003, which provides that: "[u]pon motion of the
Government, the court may depart downward not more than 4
levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the
Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for the district in which the court resides."'2 9 At the same
time, the Commission filed a report with Congress, warning of
possible sentencing disparities created by section 5K3.1:
Defendants sentenced in districts without authorized early
disposition programs, however, can be expected to receive
longer sentences than similarly-situated defendants in districts with such programs. This type of geographical disparity
appears to be at odds with the overall Sentencing Reform Act
goal of reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarly-situated offenders. Furthermore, sentencing courts in
districts without early disposition programs, particularly
those in districts that adjoin districts with such programs,
may feel pressured to employ other measures---downward de-

125. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the U.S., Dep't of Justice, to U.S.
Att'ys on Justice Dep't's "Fast-Track" Policies (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT. R.
134 (2003).
126. Id. at 134.
127. Id. at 135.
128. United States v. Lua-Guizar, 656 F.3d 563, 568 (2011) (citing Memorandum from
David W. Ogden, Deputy Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to U.S. Attorneys on Authorization for Early Disposition Programs (May 29, 2009), reprinted in 21 FED. SENT. REP. 318,
337-38 (2009)).
129. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (2003).
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partures in particular-to reach similar sentencing outcomes
for similarly situated defendants.
As foreshadowed by the Sentencing Commission, defendants in
districts without fast-track programs began to argue that the existence of those programs elsewhere created unwarranted sentencing disparities, which entitled them to downward variances because sentencing judges must consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 131 Courts
also have noted that the geographic distribution of fast-track districts does not appear to reflect the realities of heavy immigration
caseloads,
as Congress seemed to have assumed would be the
32
1

case.

As with the career offender Guideline, the courts of appeals
have disagreed as to whether district judges may reject an advisory Guidelines sentencing range based on policy disagreements
with the fast-track provision. 3 3 Three important facts about the
nature of the fast-track provision warrant particular mention.
First, like the career offender Guideline, the fast-track policy
statement was promulgated following a congressional directive to
the Commission; 3 1 unlike the career offender section, however, it
is a policy statement, not a Guideline, so it does not factor into the
calculation of the advisory sentencing range, although it is part of
130. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 66-67 (2003) (footnote omitted), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20031127082937/http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.p
df, quoted in United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 410-11 (7th Cir. 2010). See
infra note 133.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2010). See infra note 133.
132. United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 2009) ("[Tlhe implementation of fast-track districts appears to be uneven .... For example, in the District
of Nebraska, which is a fast-track district, immigration offenses comprised 11.77% of all
sentences, while in the Northern District of Florida, which is a non-fast track district, immigration offenses comprised 20.94% of all sentences.") (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 183, 216 (2007)).
133. Compare United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2009), United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 563 (5th Cir. 2008), and United States v. VegaCastillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2008) (all holding that sentencing judges may
not vary downward based on potential sentencing disparities with fast-track districts), with
Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d at 417, 419, 422, United States v. Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d
244, 249, 250-51 (6th Cir. 2010), Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 149, and United States v.
Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 231 (1st Cir. 2008) (all holding that sentencing judges may vary
downward based on potential sentencing disparities with fast-track districts).
134. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (codified in scattered sections of
18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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the district court's consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). 1 5
Second, the Commission has expressed reservations about the policy statement, suggesting that it could result in unwarranted disparities, as well as reservations about sentencing judges varying
downward to avoid such disparities, suggesting that they could
undercut the PROTECT Act's goal of decreasing downward variances. 136 Finally, it may contradict 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which
requires judges to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have followed their preKimbrough precedents and held that sentencing judges in districts
without fast-track programs may not vary downward merely because other districts have such programs."7 They reasoned that
because policy statement section 5K3.1 reflects not only the Commission's policy choice but also a congressional policy choice, including choosing to allow the Attorney General to authorize fasttrack programs in some districts but not others, sentencing judges
could not reject it based on a policy disagreement.'3 8 Those courts
focused on whether the discrepancy between fast-track districts
and non-fast-track districts created "unwarranted sentence disparities" under § 3553(a)(6).139 They all found that Kimbrough had
not abrogated earlier precedents, holding that "because any disparity that results from fast-track programs is intended by Con-

135. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2010); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5)
(2010).
136. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 130, at 67, quoted in Reyes-Hernandez,
624 F.3d at 411.
137. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 740; Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d at 563; Vega-Castillo,
540 F.3d at 1238-39 (citations omitted).
138. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 739-40 ("Although Kimbrough permits district courts
to 'vary from Guidelines ranges based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines,' it does not address a district court's ability to vary from the
Guidelines based on disagreement with congressional policy, the situation we confront
here." (citation omitted)); Gomez-Herrera,523 F.3d at 559 ("Kimbrough, which concerned a
district court's ability to sentence in disagreement with Guideline policy, does not control
this case, which concerns a district court's ability to sentence in disagreement with Congressional policy."); Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1239 ("[Wle note that 'Kimbrough addressed
only a district court's discretion to vary from the Guidelines based on a disagreement with
Guideline, not Congressional, policy.' (quoting Gomez-Herrera,523 F.3d at 563)).
139. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 740 ("[Flast-track disparities are not 'unwarranted' so
as to permit their consideration under § 3553(a)(6)."); Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d at 562
("[B]ecause any disparity that results from fast-track programs is intended by Congress, it
is not 'unwarranted' within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6)."); Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1238
(relying on pre-Kimbrough precedent holding that fast-track disparities are not unwarranted).
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gress, it is not 'unwarranted' within the meaning of §
3553(a)(6)." 4 '
The First, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, however, have
overruled their contrary precedents in light of Kimbrough and
held that sentencing judges in districts without fast-track programs may vary downward merely because other districts have
such programs.' 4 These courts have rejected the idea that the policy statement in section 5K3.1 embodies a legislative policy to
which sentencing judges must adhere, with one court noting that
the PROTECT Act "simply authorizes the Sentencing Commission
to issue a policy statement and, in the wake of Kimbrough, such a
directive, whether or not suggestive, is not decisive as to what
may constitute a permissible ground for a variant sentence."4 2 In
fact, the First and Third Circuits found just the opposite: because
the policy statement was promulgated at the behest of Congress, it
did not exemplify an "exercise of [the Commission's] characteristic
institutional role" and was thus entitled to less deference under
Kimbrough.143
Courts allowing variances based on disagreement with section
5K3.1 also considered and rejected the idea that allowing such
variances would impinge upon the policy decisions and prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General in establishing fast-track
districts.! But they found no conflict between Congress's approval of the Attorney General's establishment of such districts and
sentencing judges' exercise of the "unquestionably judicial function" of deciding whether to grant the variances requested, by the
government or by the defendant, in any given case. 45 In fact,
some courts found that the extent of prosecutorial discretionparticularly in districts where the early disposition programs used

140. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d at 562 (citing pre-Kimbrough cases). See also GonzalezZotelo, 556 F.3d at 739 (citing United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 719 (9th
Cir. 2006)); Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1238 (citing United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249,
1252 (l1th Cir.2006)).
141. United States v. Jimenez-Perez, 659 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2011);. ReyesHernandez, 624 F.3d at 417; United States v. Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d 244, 249 (6th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 231 (1st Cir. 2008).
142. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 229 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted),
quoted in Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 151. See also Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d at 418;
Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d at 249.
143. See Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 155; Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 227 (citation omitted).
144. See Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d at 421-22; Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 230.
145. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d at 421-22 (citation omitted); Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 230.
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"charge bargaining," as opposed to departures within the Guidelines-further justified such variances, because such prosecutorial
practices were not part of Congress's grant of authority in the
PROTECT Act or part of the Guidelines.'
Courts of appeals remain sharply divided as to whether to allow
sentencing judges to vary downward based on potential disparities
between defendants charged for certain immigration offenses in
fast-track and non-fast-track districts. This division stands in contrast to their treatment of the career offender Guideline, where a
trend toward allowing policy-based variances is apparent. Once
again, the principal difference of opinion seems to be between
courts holding that the Guidelines reflect a legislative policy
choice, which cannot be countermanded by sentencing judges' policy disagreements, and courts holding that legislative direction,
short of statutory mandatory sentences, actually makes the
Guidelines more open to such disagreements, because the Commission has not exercised its characteristic institutional function.
Unlike the career offender Guideline, but like the crack/powder
Guideline at issue in Kimbrough, the fast-track policy statement
has been criticized on policy grounds by the Sentencing Commission.'4 7 Unlike in Kimbrough, however, the Commission has also
articulated policy reasons against allowing sentencing courts to
vary downward.'
Courts and litigants have generally considered
these extra-Guidelines statements by the Commission, as the
Kimbrough Court did, but they are not dispositive.
146. Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d at 250 (citation omitted) ("[Elven if Congress could be
said to have endorsed some disparity between defendants in fast-track and non-fast-track
districts, it has not endorsed the further disparity that is created by charge bargaining ....
Surely, judges in districts in which such charge bargaining is not routine for illegal-reentry
defendants would be justified in imposing reduced sentences based on the disparity created
by this prosecutorial practice."); Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 152 (describing chargebargaining programs as "alternative district-wide, early-disposition programs [that] operate outside the bounds of not only the Protect Act, but also Guidelines § 5K3. 1").
147. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 130, at 67.
148. Id.
149. Courts undertaking a Kimbrough analysis of the fast-track provision do not typically give any weight to the fact that it is a policy statement rather than an actual Guideline
section, perhaps because it is unclear exactly how to treat them differently. See cases cited
infra note 133. Sentencing judges must calculate and consider the advisory Guidelines
range under § 3553(a)(4) and then must consider applicable Guidelines policy statements
under § 3553(a)(5). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5) (2010). Policy statements, which were advisory even before Booker and do not form part of the required Guidelines range calculation,
are less controlling than other Guidelines sections. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2010); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). That may suggest that sentencing judges
have more discretion to vary based upon policy statements. On the other hand, because
policy statements are only advisory, sentencing judges in non-fast-track districts are faced,

28
C.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 50

United States Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.2-Child
Pornography

Guidelines section 2G2.2 sets the offense level for most child
pornography offenses, including possessing, receiving, trafficking,
transporting, shipping, soliciting, and advertising "Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor."15 ° It does so by setting
base offense levels and then supplementing them with several enhancements. In the first edition of the Guidelines, the Commission set an offense level of thirteen for violations of 18 U.S.C. §
2252 (covering trafficking in child pornography). 15' Because possession of child pornography was not then a federal crime, it was
not included."' Section 2G2.2 included two possible enhancements
at that time: an increase of two levels for images depicting a child
under twelve years of age and an increase of 5 or more levels for
distribution, depending on the retail value of the material distributed.'
Since it was first promulgated along with the rest of the Guidelines in 1987, section 2G2.2 has been amended nine times to increase penalties through sentencing enhancements, usually at the
direction of Congress."' Now, section 2G2.2 provides a base offense level of eighteen for possession"' of child pornography (and
for the creation of images depicting child pornography that did not
actually involve the abuse of a minor) and a base offense level of
twenty-two for trafficking in child pornography (including distri-

not with a straightforward disparity (wherein if a defendant were being sentenced elsewhere, his Guidelines range would definitely be lower), but rather a potential disparity,
depending on whether a judge in a fast-track district would exercise her discretion to depart downward under section 5K3.1. That may suggest less need to vary downward.
Courts of appeals apparently have not grappled with this question, choosing rather to treat
the fast-track policy statement the same as a Guideline for purposes of determining whether policy-based variances were appropriate. See cases cited infra note 133.
150.
151.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2010).
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES

at
available
(2009),
10
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/ResearchProjects/SexOffenses/20091030_HistoryChildPo
rnographyGuidelines.pdf.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2, 16, 54.
155. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2010). A Guidelines section covering possession was added in 1991, section 2G2.4, aftr Congress made possession of child
pornography a federal crime. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 151 at 19. Section
2G2.4 was eventually incorporated into section 2G2.2, which now covers both trafficking
and possession. Id. at 48-49.
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bution, transport, and receipt).5 6 The current version of section
2G2.2 also includes a host of enhancements, including: material
involving a prepubescent minor or a minor under the age of twelve
years (two levels); distribution (two to seven levels, depending on
the circumstances); material portraying sadistic, masochistic, or
violent conduct (four levels); a pattern of activity involving the
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor (five levels); the use of a
computer (two levels); and multiple images (two to five levels, depending on the number of images). 5 ' The enhancements for use of
a computer, depictions of a prepubescent minor, and number of
images apply in the great majority of cases.'
Twice, in 1988 and 1990, the Commission amended section
2G2.2 on its own initiative. 9 These amendments broadened the
enhancement for images depicting a child under twelve, by also
including images depicting a prepubescent child, since it can be
difficult to prove the exact age of a child from an image, and added
the four-level enhancement for sadistic, masochistic, or violent
images.6 ° The Commission amended section 2G2.2 seven times in
response to congressional mandate in the form of either a directive
to the Commission to amend the section in particular ways or the
enactment of a law creating new offenses or increasing mandatory
minimum and maximum sentences.'
In 1991, when Congress
was dissatisfied with the Commission's amendments, it directed
the Commission to amend the section again and ordered it to treat
receipt of child pornography more harshly, by ordering receipt to
be treated like trafficking rather than like possession. 162 In the
PROTECT Act of 2003, Congress itself amended the child pornography Guidelines, adding the enhancement for the number of
images and adding the enhancement for sadistic, masochistic, or
violent content to the Guidelines for possession of child pornogra-

156.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2.

157. Id.
158. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 151, at 46 ("[Tlhe overwhelming majority of
these offenders received a 2-level enhancement for use of a computer (89.4%) and a 2-level
enhancement for material involving a child under 12 (91.4%)."); United States v. Dorvee,
616 F.3d 174, 186 n. 9 (2d Cir. 2010) ("96.6% of defendants received at least a two-level
enhancement based on the number of images possessed.").
159. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 151, at 11-17.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 17-53.
162. Id. at 23.
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phy.'
This was the "first and only time to date [that Congress]
directly amended the guidelines. " 164
Often, the Commission expressed reservations about the extent,
nature, and effects of the congressional directives.1 6' For instance,
the Commission objected to Congress's plan to treat receipt of
child pornography like trafficking rather than like possession, because it "would negate the Commission's carefully structured efforts to treat similar conduct similarly and ... [would ultimately]
reintroduce sentencing disparity among similar defendants." 66
Despite the Commission's reservations, Congress made the change
itself, directly amending the Guidelines.6 7 Later, the Commission
objected to Congress's directive to implement a blanket two-level
computer enhancement because it would apply equally to an individual downloader of child pornography, one who emails it to a
single recipient, and one "who establish[es] a[n electronic bulletin
board] and distribute[s] child pornography to large numbers of
subscribers." 8 Congress left the directive
in place, and the Com69
enhancement.
the
implemented
mission
In light of this history, only the Eleventh Circuit has rejected
the argument that section 2G2.2 is susceptible to the same criticism as the crack/powder Guideline, finding that section 2G2.2
does "not exhibit the deficiencies the Supreme Court identified in
Kimbrough."7 ° It reasoned that section 2G2.2 "is derived at least
in part from the early Parole Guidelines, rather than directly derived from Congressional mandate," although it appears to have
considered only the initial promulgation of the Guidelines, without
discussing the subsequent amendments or the interaction between
Congress and the Sentencing Commission.17' The Eleventh Circuit
further found that Kimbrough was inapposite because, while "the
Supreme Court found that the Sentencing Commission itself had
163. Id. at 38-39.
164. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 151, at 38.
165. See United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir. 2010).
166. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 185 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
102-141, § 632, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (1992).

168. UNITED
OFFENSES

STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
AGAINST
CHILDREN
30

REPORT

TO THE CONGRESS:

SEX

(1996),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative-andPublicAffairs/CongressionalTestimonyandReports
/SexOffenseTopics/199606 RtC Sex.Crimes-AgainstChildren/199606-RtC SCAC.PDF.
169. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 168, at 31-32.
170. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1201 n.15 (11th Cir. 2008).
171. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1201 n.15 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 72 (Revised Draft Jan. 1987)).
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'reported that the crack/powder disparity produces disproportiothe Sentencing Commission has not
nately harsh sanctions'
made any similar statements" regarding section 2G2.2. 72 Although the Eleventh Circuit did "not rule out the possibility that a
sentencing court could ever make a reasoned case for disagreeing
with the policy judgments behind the child pornography guidelines," it has not issued an opinion finding that one has done so.173
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have held that sentencing judges may vary downward based
on policy disagreements with Guideline section 2G2.2.174 All three
courts considered the particular history of section 2G2.2 and concluded that it was not developed through empirical study or the
exercise of the Commission's characteristic institutional role.'
Both the Second and Third Circuits went on to review the reasonableness of the sentencing judge's policy disagreement.17 ' For its
part, the First Circuit has acknowledged in dicta that Kimbrough
authorizes a variance from section 2G2.2.177
The aforementioned courts have found problems not only with
the history of section 2G2.2, but also with its results. As the
Second Circuit explained in Dorvee, with enhancements that apply
to a majority of defendants, section 2G2.2 recommends an offense
level of thirty-five, yielding a probable advisory Guidelines range
of 168 to 210 months for first-time offenders. 78 This has the effect
of "concentrating all offenders at or near the statutory maximum,"
thereby allowing for "virtually no distinction between sentences
for [relatively less culpable] defendants . . .and the sentences for
the most dangerous offenders who, for example, distribute child
pornography for pecuniary gain and who fall in higher criminal
history categories."'79 Moreover, applying the enhancements in
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1212 n.32 (11th Cir. 2010).
174. United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 608-09 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 183 (2d
Cir. 2010).
175. Henderson, 649 F.3d at 960-63; Grober, 624 F.3d at 608; Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 188.
176. Grober, 624 F.3d at 609-10 (citation omitted); Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 183-87 (citation
omitted). See also Henderson, 649 F.3d at 965-68 (Berzon, J., concurring) (citation omitted)
(stating that the majority should have reviewed the policy disagreement and doing so).
177. United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 97 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming a withinGuidelines sentence under section 2G2.2, but expressing the view that "the sentencing
guidelines at issue are in our judgment harsher than necessary .... Were we collectively
sitting as the district court, we would have used our Kimbrough power to impose a somewhat lower sentence").
178. Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 186.
179. Id. at 187.
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section 2G2.2 can create some marked irrationalitiesrecommending a higher sentencing range for defendants, like
Dorvee (sentenced for distributing child pornography to a minor)-than for those who physically abuse a minor, and recommending the same sentencing range for a first-time offender convicted of possessing non-violent videos on a computer as for a repeat offender convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm that
resulted in bodily injury."s Such results suggest that section
2G2.2 can produce unwarranted sentencing disparities, which
courts must seek to avoid under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), and that
the Guideline contradicts many judges' senses of whether the sentence "reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote[s] respect for the law, and . . . provide[s] just punishment for the offense" under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 181
IV. LOOKING FORWARD
Although Kimbrough and Spears empower judges to exercise
broad discretion at sentencing, they should not be construed as a
green light to exercise will instead of judgment based merely on a
personal disagreement with a policy expressed by the Sentencing
Guidelines. In analyzing a particular Guideline, district courts
would do well to consider both its provenance and the policy arguments for and against it. These two inquiries will often be intertwined-after all, sentencing "decisions made by the Commission [and Congress] are far from technical, but are heavily laden
(or ought to be) with value judgments and policy assessments, but both inquiries ought to be undertaken before a Guideline is
rejected categorically.
In reviewing the provenance of a Guideline, the central question
is whether it reflects "the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role."'83 Although Kimbrough itself does not require such a determination, most courts that have applied Kim-

180. Id. See also Grober, 624 F.3d at 607.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2010). Guidelines section 2G2.2 is notably unpopular with
federal district judges. A 2010 survey revealed that 69% of respondents thought that the
Guideline range for receipt of child pornography was too high, and 70% thought it was too
high for possession; only the crack cocaine Guideline range is comparably unpopular (70%
finding it too high), with the marijuana Guideline range a distant third at 41%. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY

2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, Question 8 (2010).
182. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 414 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
183. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007).
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brough to different Guidelines have addressed the question, and
those holding that a Guideline can be disregarded on policy
grounds almost uniformly find that the Commission has not exercised its expertise in promulgating that particular Guideline.184 In
making this inquiry, courts must consider the Guideline's origin
and its subsequent history. When was it adopted? Did the Commission extrapolate the Guideline from statutes and, if it did, was
there sound reason for doing so (as the Court found there was not
in Kimbrough)? Or did the Commission model the Guideline on
findings from empirical study? What was the role of Congress?
How specifically did Congress direct or guide the Commission's
creation of the Guideline? Did Congress change the Guideline itself? What was the Commission's reaction to congressional input?
It bears noting that although the Commission need not have expressed reservations about a Guideline for a court to find it objectionable on policy grounds, courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court have upheld categorical variances more often when the
Commission has done so.185
But the inquiry cannot end at the role of the Sentencing Commission and the history of the Guideline at issue. Whatever the
Guideline's provenance, the ultimate question after Kimbrough
and Spears is whether the advisory sentencing range is reasonable. In undertaking a policy review of a Guideline, courts must
consider whether it-as a matter of course, especially in the
"mine-run" case-comports with or contradicts the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).'
Kimbrough and Spears do not require district courts to exercise
their discretion to vary categorically from the advisory Guidelines
ranges. But as defendants increasingly cite those cases as support
for categorical rejection, district courts will be drawn into evaluat184. See United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 960-63 (9th Cir. 2011); Grober, 624
F.3d at 608; Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 188; United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142,
155 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2008).
185. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109; Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 960-61; Grober, 624 F.3d
at 608; United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 417 (7th Cir. 2010); Dorvee, 616
F.3d at 188; United States v. Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d 244, 249 (6th Cir. 2010); Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at149; Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 231. Cf United States v. VegaCastillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2008) (considering the Commission's concern
that non-fast-track districts would vary categorically from the fast-track Guideline as a
basis for not allowing such categorical variances).
186. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 575. The court must always consider how an advisory
sentence comports with the 3553(a) factors when considered in light of the particular crime
and the defendant before it, but this is an individualized inquiry, distinct from a policy
disagreement authorized by Kimbrough and Spears. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010).
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ing every policy underlying every challenged Guideline. This enterprise runs the risk of asking district judges to opine on broad
policy questions as they seek to impose just sentences upon the
individual defendants who appear before them.
Courts of appeals, in turn, will increasingly be required to review variances based on policy disagreements with various Guidelines. If such categorical variances become the norm, not only
with respect to the crack/powder disparity, but across the Guidelines writ large, Congress might impose new, detailed statutory
penalties that will leave district judges with even less discretion
than they possessed in the mandatory Guidelines era. Whether
Congress chooses to act in this regard might depend upon whether
it deems the judiciary to be exercising prudent judgment as opposed to imposing its will on broad questions of crime and punishment.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Booker ushered in a new era of
sentencing. By leaving the Sentencing Guidelines in place as an
advisory matter, however, the Court did not return federal courts
to the days of essentially unfettered discretion that existed before
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission. The
Guidelines remain an important frame of reference and starting
point for trial judges as they seek to impose just sentences.
The Court's decisions in Kimbrough and Spears make clear that
district judges may adopt their own crack/powder ratios based on
their policy preferences. Whether that principle extends to all
Guidelines may soon be answered by the Supreme Court, and the
career offender and child pornography Guidelines, as well as the
policy statement related to fast-track jurisdictions, are likely candidates for resolution in light of the differences of opinion expressed by courts of appeals to date. If the Court extends Kimbrough/Spears to the Guidelines writ large, district courts should
take care to exercise judgment instead of will, lest history show
that Booker heralded not a welcome era of guided discretion, but
the death knell of the Sentencing Guidelines.

